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This Brief is submitted by the Utah Utility 
Shareholder Association of Utah (the •Association•), and Alex 
Oblad and Harold Burton, shareholders of Mountain Fuel supply 
Company (the •shareholders•), collectively referred to herein 
as the "Plaintiffs•, in support of their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case, commonly known as the Wexpro litigation, is 
on certiorari appeal herein to this Court from an order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah (the •commission•) for the 
second time. In the first appeal, the Court reversed an 
earlier order of the Commission and remanded the case for 
further hearing before that agency in January, 1980. 1 
After several pre-trial hearings, the matter was set 
for further proceedings in August of 1981. Extensive 
negotiations were undertaken during the summer of 1981 between 
respective legal counsel and officials of Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company ("MFs• or the •company•) and Wexpro Company (•wexpro•), 
on the one hand, and the Utah Division of Public Utilities (the 
"Division•) and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services (the 
1 In Committee of Consumer Services v. Public 
Service Comm'n, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1014 (the •wexpro Decision•), this court reversed and 
remanded the Commission's order dated April 11, 1978, in Case 
No. 76-057-14. 
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"Committee"), on the other hand {collectively referred to as 
the "Parties"), in an effort to reach an accommodated 
settlement of the complex and manifold case. Other parties, 
including the Utah Coalition of Senior Citizens (the 
"Coalition") were invited to attend the negotiating sessions. 
on August 31, 1981, the Parties filed a joint motion 
before the Commission wherein they requested that the 
Commission adopt and approve a Stipulation and Agreement (the 
"Agreement") 2 resolving issues on remand from the Wexpro 
Decision and certain other issues which were developed and 
reserved in Commission orders involving general rate increases 
in case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01, 81-057-01 and 
exploration program matters in Case No. 81-057-04. (Stip. 
at§ 2.) 3 
2 The staff of the Public Service Commission of 
Wyoming is a party to the Agreement. on October 28, 1981, the 
Public service Commission of Wyoming, after hearing, entered 
an order approving the Agreement as being in the public 
interest. No party has appealed that approval. 
3 The following abbreviations are used for the 
purpose of citation in this Brief: (1) "Agr." refers to the 
Agreement and "Stip." refers to the Stipulation; reference is 
made to Sections therein; (2) "Tr." refers to the transcript of 
the evidentiary hearings before the Commission commencing 
October 14, 1981; (3) "Ord." refers to the Report and Order on 
Stipulation and Agreement issued by the Commission on December 
31, 1981; (4) "Br." refers to the Brief submitted on November 
20, 1981 by the Association to the Commission; (6) "Appl." 
refers to the Application for Rehearing submitted by the 
Plaintiffs to the Commission on January 18, 1982. 
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The Commission scheduled the motion for hearing in 
October of 1981, and took better than eight days of testimony 
and argument in connection with the terms and provisions of the 
proposed Agreement. After extensive briefing and further 
argument by all parties wishing to appear before the 
Commission, an order was entered on December 31, 1981 (the 
"Order"), approving the Agreement under proscribed conditions. 
Petitions for Rehearing filed by the Association, Coalition, 
and a new party, the Utah Department of Administrative 
Services, were denied by the Commission on February 9, 1982. 
This Petition for Certiorari is taken from the Order. 
1. Background Information Relating to the 
Company's Exploration Program 
Prior to the Company's formation in 1935, certain of 
the Company's predecessor organizations operated unregulated 
exploration and development programs under which they acquired 
unexplored leasehold acreage, maintained oil and gas 
exploration activities and developed significant oil and gas 
reserves without participation of any utility company funds. 
(Tr. at 1373, 1384.) After its formation in 1935, the Company 
continued the program established by its predecessors. (Tr. at 
1372.) The method used in accounting for this program on the 
company's books, including the classification of assets 
developed under it as utility or non-utility properties, was 
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based upon the "Uniform System of Accounts" promulgated by the 
Federal Power commission and adopted by the commission and was 
approved, and to a significant extent mandated, by orders of 
the Commission over a period of 40 years. (Tr. at 1374-78, 
1384-86.) Under the accounting system, unsuccessful 
exploration costs, including dry hole costs, were expensed in 
the year incurred. The costs related to successful wells were 
capitalized into utility accounts if the well in question were 
classified as a gas well and into non-utility accounts if 
classified as an oil well. This method of classification was 
specifically approved by orders of the Commission. Id. 
Since 1947, the Commission determined that a part of 
the unsuccessful exploration expenses of the program should be 
treated as normal utility operating expenses and included some 
specified amount of the expenses in its ratemaking equation. 
(Tr. at 1377-80.) The extent to which the specified portion of 
exploration expenses was recognized as one of the ordinary 
costs of doing business and was recovered through rates has 
varied from time to time. The portion of those business 
expenses not included or not recovered in rates has been paid 
directly from the non-utility account and, since its 
organization in 1976, by Wexpro. Since 1975, these 
unsuccessful exploration expenses have been split on a 50/50 
basis between the utility and the non-utility or wexpro. 
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The capital costs or investment in successful wells 
were never expensed. {Tr. at 1378-79.) Rather, the portion of 
capital costs associated with investment of shareholder funds 
in unexplored leases and successful gas wells was included, 
with other assets, in utility rate base upon which the utility 
business of the Company had an opportunity to earn a return. 
{Tr. at 1376, 1379, 1381.) Shareholders of MFS invested their 
funds in the Company and based their investment decisions, in 
part, in reliance on the accounting practices approved by the 
Commission in numerous orders during the 40 year period 
relating to the conduct of the exploration program. 
The inclusion of unsuccessful drilling costs as an 
expense in setting rates and the existence of non-utility oil 
properties resulted in contention for many years. (Tr. at 
1377.) As early as 1953, consumer groups sought to have the 
oil properties rolled into utility accounts and to have oil 
revenues used to reduce gas rates. {Tr. at 1378.) Prior to 
1974, the Commission denied this request each time it was made, 
and final orders were entered determining that the non-utility 
oil properties should not and could not be considered as 
utility plant in setting natural gas rates. (Tr. at 1378-80.) 
on January 14, 1974, in case No. 6668, the Commission 
entered an order which rolled oil revenues, expenses and 
investments into the utility accounts. News of this order 
played havoc with trading of MFS stock and trading of the stock 
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was suspended by the New York Stock Exchange. Before the 
Commission issued such order, the Company's stock was trading 
at $84 per share. After the announcement of the January 14, 
1974 order, and during the trading suspension, from 300,000 to 
500,000 shares were offered for sale with only a single offer 
to buy at $35 per share. (Case No. 6668.) After rehearing, 
the Commission vacated its order on January 21, 1974, and 
returned to the long established exploration and development 
program that was previously approved with the separation of 
utility and non-utility accounts. Trading in the Company's 
common stock resumed when the Commission vacated its January 
14, 1974 order, but at a lower price. Nevertheless, the 
pressure from consumer groups to have oil revenues used to 
reduce gas rates continued to be a source of friction. Because 
both the regulated utility business and the unregulated oil 
business of MFS are capital intensive, requiring large amounts 
of investor funds on a regular basis, and because of the bitter 
experience suffered as a result of the order of the Commission 
and the continuing consumer group pressures, serious concern 
about the ability to raise capital at reasonable rates faced 
the Company. 
MFS recognized many years ago that mixing utility and 
non-utility activities in exploration might create problems. 
In 1950 it filed petitions with the Utah and Wyoming 
commissions to separate the exploration program from the 
utility distribution operations. Wyoming approved the petition 
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but Utah did not. (Tr. at 1376.) The Utah Commission found 
that the problems of a joint program were being appropriately 
handled in 1950 and reaffirmed this ruling in 1953, 1957, 1960 
(requiring some adjustments), 1968 and 1972 (requiring further 
adjustments). 
However, the 1974 Commission order created new 
concerns for MFS and its shareholders despite the fact that it 
was vacated. In 1976, a group of shareholders sought to take 
control of the Company in a "proxy fight" based upon the 
potential for problems which existed because MFS had not 
completely separated unregulated oil properties and activities 
from utility programs. (Tr. 1388-89.) In an effort to 
safeguard shareholder investments, to attract additional 
investment capital, to protect non-utility oil properties from 
utility regulation, to allow expanded exploration activities in 
an unregulated environment and to enhance system gas supplies, 
Wexpro was created as a wholly-owned MFS subsidiary in late 
1976. The oil properties then in the non-utility account were 
transferred to Wexpro under the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, 
and the Joint Exploration Agreement ("JEA") was established to 
govern drilling activities on properties of joint interest 
between the utility and Wexpro. 
2. History of the wexpro Litigation 
The wexpro case was commenced in December of 1976, 
when the Division, and later the Committee, challenged the 
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Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the JEA. The Commission 
entered an order on July 20, 1977, holding that it had no 
jurisdiction over the transfer. Thereafter, the Commission 
ordered a rehearing to consider certain modifications to the 
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and JEA which would allow MFS to 
receive all natural gas produced on transferred and joint 
interest properties at cost-of-service. The rehearing was held 
over a period of several weeks. On April 11, 1978, the 
Commission entered its Report and order on Rehearing approving 
the Agreement of Purchase and sale and JEA if certain 
amendments were made. The amendments were agreed to by MFS and 
Wexpro. 
The Division and Committee sought review of the order 
before the Utah Supreme Court. On May 10, 1979, the court 
rendered the Wexpro Decision reversing the order and remanding 
the case to the Commission for further hearings. 
During the pendancy of the proceedings, MFS received 
rate relief in case Nos. 77-057-03 (Count II), 79-057-03, 
80-057-01 and 81-057-01. The rate relief in each of those 
cases was conditional upon further proceedings. Additionally, 
in March of 1980, MFS, Wexpro, Mountain Fuel Resources, Inc. 
(Resources) and Celsius Energy Company ("Celsius") filed 
applications with the Federal Energy Regulatory commission 
("FERC"), Docket Nos. CPB0-274, CPB0-275 and CI80-233, seeking, 
inter alia, approval to transfer all unexplored leasehold 
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properties used in interstate commerce to Celsius. 4 Celsius 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Entrada Industries, Inc., which 
is in turn, a wholly-owned subsidiary of MFS. No decision has 
been rendered on these applications to date. 5 
In December of 1980, MFS and wexpro filed an action 
against the Commission, Division and Committee in the United 
states District court for the District of Utah, Mountain Fuel 
supply co. v. Public service commission of Utah, Civil No. 
C80-0710J (D. Utah, July 23, 1981), challenging the application 
of the Wexpro Decision on constitutional grounds. That action 
was dismissed without prejudice, the court holding that it was 
premature prior to the Commission's hearings in the Wexpro 
case. Finally, Wexpro issues were raised before the Wyoming 
Public Service Commission in its Docket No. 9192 Sub 68. 
3. summary of Agreement 
In an effort to resolve the difficult issues raised by 
the wexpro Decision and related litigation, to prevent loss of 
leasehold properties, to restore investor confidence and raise 
4 In addition to the regulatory jurisdiction of the 
Utah and Wyoming commissions involving retail sales of natural 
gas, MFS is also subject to the regulation of FERC, under the 
Natural Gas Act, for its gas transmission facilities, sales for 
resale in interstate commerce, transportation contracts and 
other aspects of its business. 
5 These applications were recently amended to 
reflect the terms of the Agreement. 
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capital for an exploration program to enhance gas resources, to · 
end the lengthy and costly litigation and to establish an 
exploration program which could compete under industry 
practices with other exploration companies, the Parties 
negotiated and entered into the Agreement. The Agreement 
provides for the division of properties, benefits and 
obligations, for the establishment and conduct of an 
exploration and development program and for the payment of 
monies. A summary of the Agreement is set forth below. 
A. Producing Gas Reservoirs. The wells, surface 
facilities and costs of developing producing gas reservoirs 
capitalized in the utility account as of July 31, 1981 will 
remain in the utility account. The gas produced from these 
reservoirs will continue to be owned by and delivered to the 
utility at cost-of-service. cost-of-service will be computed 
in the manner approved by the Commission in the past. The gas 
liquids and oil from presently producing wells will also belong 
to the utility and the revenues from the sale of these 
hydrocarbons will be utilized to reduce rates. wexpro will be 
the operator of the properties and will receive reimbursement 
for its expenses as its only compensation. (Agr. at§ III). 
B. Development Drilling of Productive Gas Fields. 
The Agreement contemplates that additional gas can be developed 
from the presently producing gas reservoirs through development 
drilling. Much of this development drilling will be around the 
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edge of the reservoir. While it is development drilling of 
known producing fields (as contrasted to wildcat drilling), 
there is still a substantial risk of dry holes. wexpro will 
provide the capital for such development drilling and will 
assume the risks of unsuccessful drilling. If a development 
well is unsuccessful, none of the costs will be borne by the 
utility or included in setting rates to the customer. The 
customers will not be called upon to provide any drilling 
funds. If a development well is successful, the costs will be 
capitalized in Wexpro, and wexpro will be allowed a 16% base 
return (the 16% base rate of return is indexed and will 
fluctuate from year to year in accordance with fluctuations in 
the rate of return on common equity allowed to twenty selected 
utilities and natural gas companies) plus an 8% premium to 
compensate for assuming all of the risks and costs of 
unsuccessful drilling (Agr. at§§ III-4 and III-5.1). All gas 
produced as a result of future development drilling on 
producing gas reservoirs will be owned by the utility. 
The Agreement further obligates Wexpro to spend not 
less than $40 million in the next five years on development gas 
well drilling, only the successful part of which will go into 
the rate base. (Agr. at§ III-8(c).) 
c. Producing Oil Reservoirs. The wells, surface 
facilities and costs of developing producing oil reservoirs are 
currently capitalized in wexpro and will remain there. Gas 
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which is produced in association with the oil will be sold to 
the utility at cost-of-service computed in the same manner the 
6 
commission presently follows. Oil revenues will be utilized 
first to pay operating expenses and a 16% base rate of return 
(indexed as above) on wexpro's investment in these properties. 
After paying the expenses and this agreed rate of return on 
investment, oil revenues will be divided 54% to the utility and 
46% to wexpro, with the utility's share of the oil revenues 
being used to reduce rates. (Agr. at § § I-41, I-44, II.) In 
the event wexpro is required to install secondary recovery 
facilities because of regulation, contract or to avoid 
financial risks, Wexpro shall provide the necessary capital 
investment for such facilities. (Agr. at§ II-6.) 
D. Development Drilling of Productive Oil Fields. 
wexpro will provide all the capital and assume all risks in 
connection with the development drilling of presently producing 
oil reservoirs. If the developmental well is unsuccessful, the 
costs will be absorbed by wexpro. If it is successful, it will 
be capitalized into wexpro's accounts and Wexpro will earn a 
16% base return (indexed as above) plus a 5% premium to 
compensate for assuming all risks and costs of unsuccessful 
6 currently, less than 1% of the utilities' gas 
requirements are supplied by gas produced in association with 
oil. Approximately 30% of the requirements come from producing 
gas reservoirs and the remainder from purchases from 
independent field producers and pipeline companies. 
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drilling. {Agr. at § II-8.} Gas developed through such 
development drilling will be sold to the utility at 
cost-of-service; oil profits, after return on investment, will 
be divided 54% to the utility and 46% to wexpro. {Agr. at 
§ II-4.) 
E. Exploratory Properties. Legal title to all oil 
and gas leasehold acreage will be transferred to Celsius in 
order that it can function as the exploration program entity. 
Nearly all of these leaseholds, approximately 1.4 million 
acres, are unexplored, wildcat properties. The utility will 
receive a 7% overriding royalty interest on all production 
resulting from drilling on the unexplored acreage. The 
transfer will result in removal of approximately $14 million 
from the utility rate base accounts and a corresponding 
reduction in the utility's revenue requirements. The cost of 
holding these properties (primarily the annual lease payments), 
which for the unexplored (Account 105) properties previously 
has been divided as a utility expense and a Wexpro 
(non-utility) expense, will be paid entirely by Celsius. 
Celsius will assume all dry hole and other exploration costs if 
exploration is not successful. Celsius will pay to the 
utility, to be used for the reduction of gas rates, an 
overriding royalty of 7% of the revenues realized from the sale 
of all hydrocarbons produced if the well is successful. The 
utility will also have a first right to purchase all the gas 
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produced by Celsius from these properties at market price, 
which is the equivalent of third-party field price for the gas 
established through arms-length negotiations. (Agr. at§ IV.) 
F. After-Acquired Properties. Since it was organized 
in late 1976, wexpro has acquired leasehold acreage for its own 
account and at its own cost. Wexpro will pay a 2 1/2% 
overriding royalty interest to MFS in connection with such 
acreage (about 128,000 acres) acquired between January 1, 1977 
and May 10, 1979 (the date of the Wexpro Decision), and on 
acreage in the Bug Field in southeastern Utah. The utility has 
a first right to purchase any gas produced from these 
properties at third-party market prices. Properties acquired 
by Wexpro totally outside the area where the utility had 
previously leased properties and various properties earned by 
Wexpro under farmout agreements, even though acquired before 
May 10, 1979, have been excluded from the utility's royalty 
interest. Properties acquired after May 10, 1979 (except 
certain Bug properties), are also excluded from this royalty. 
(Agr. at§ V). 
G. Farmouts. In the event any of the wildcat acreage 
is farmed out, rather than being drilled by Celsius, Celsius 
will endeavor to preserve the 7% royalty. If it is unable to 
farm out the properties with the farmee agreeing to pay the 7% 
on the interest acquired by it, Celsius will be required to pay 
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a 10% override on its proportionately reduced retained 
interest. (Agr. at§ IV-4(b). 
H. Payments. In order to settle all claims for 
proceeds of oil production for past periods and to resolve the 
reserved issues in Case Nos. 77-057-03, 79-057-03, 80-057-01 
and 81-057-01, the utility will make a one-time refund by means 
of reduced rates, to customers, of $21 million. In addition, 
Wexpro will pay the utility, to be used for reduction of rates 
to customers, $250,000 per year for 12 consecutive years. 
Commission Proceedings 
On August 3, 1981, the Parties presented the 
Commission with a summary of the proposed Agreement. The 
Commission set the matter for hearing on October 14, 1981, at 
which time the Association and the Coalition entered their 
appearances. The Parties, the Coalition and the Association 
presented evidence and argument before the Commission during 
the course of hearings held on October 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20, 
1981, and November 23, 24 and 25, 1981. Additionally, a 
spokesman for stand United for Rate Fairness, a utility 
consumer group, made a statement to the Commission expressing 
its reservations about the Agreement. Notice was published in 
a newspaper of statewide distribution for two consecutive days 
publicizing the hearings and the opportunity for public 
comment. The news media provided extensive coverage of the 
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hearings and gave notice of the opportunity for public 
comment. (Ord. at 4 and 5.) 
The commission issued its Report and Order on 
stipulation and Agreement on December 31, 1981, adopting and 
approving the Agreement. On January 18, 1982, the Association 
and the Shareholders made application for rehearing on the 
basis that the Order does not comport with the intent and 
purpose that the Agreement be approved with finality, and that 
the Commission erred by entering an ambiguous and unlawful 
decision which failed to incorporate essential findings and 
conclusions concerning its ~inal and binding effect. The 
Coalition and Utah Department of Administrative Services also 
filed applications for rehearing dated January 20, 1982. All 
applications were denied by the Commission in a written order 
dated February 9, 1982. 
A. The Agreement was Entered After Vigorous Arm's 
Length Negotiations to Resolve the Issues 
Presented by the wexpro Decision. 
The Agreement was entered into by the Parties in an 
effort to resolve numerous conflicts and divisive issues 
arising from the Wexpro Decision and expanded litigation. The 
,Agreement was the result of vigorous and difficult arm's length 
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negotiations between the Committee and Division on one side and 
MFS and wexpro on the other. (Tr. at 1015-1016.) 7 
The purpose and intent of the Agreement is to provide 
for the division and allocation of properties for fair market 
value and additionally to provide incentives for their 
exploration and development in compliance with the wexpro 
Decision. The Agreement itself and the evidence and argument 
presented by the Parties reveal that while settlement of issues 
presented by the Wexpro Decision seemed almost impossible given 
their complexity and the diverse views of the Parties, it was 
in the best interest of the customers and shareholders to reach 
an accord so as to avoid the expense of time consuming 
litigation which would further result in the loss of valuable 
property rights. (Stip. at § § 1.19, 1.20, 1.24, 1.25, and 14; 
Tr. at 939-944.) 
The uncertainties arising from the Wexpro Decision and 
related litigation created a cloud over the Company's 
exploration and development program. A primary motivation for 
pursuing the difficult task of reaching an accord was to avoid 
the loss of many valuable leases which were about to expire and 
to prevent the additional loss of experienced and valued 
employees in a competitive market where job security and 
7 Herman G. Roseman testified for the Division and 
stated in response to a question of whether negotiations were 
at arm's length: "At arm's, sometimes, arm plus a baseball 
bat.n Tr. at 1015. 
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certainty are highly sought commodities. (Tr. at 942, 
1935-1937.) The uncertain future of the Company's exploration 
and development program also resulted in the loss of business 
opportunities and an inability and unwillingness to finance 
major expenditures necessary to continue effective exploration 
and development. (Tr. at 940, 943-945.) 
B. The Primary Purpose of the Agreement is to 
Resolve Issues with Finality. 
It is apparent from the Agreement that the achievement 
of finality is its paramount purpose and a condition to its 
vitality. The Agreement provides that the conveyance terms are 
absolute and not subject to rescission. (Agr. at§ VIII-5.) 
It is an express condition to the enforceability of the 
Agreement that it be approved by the Commission and any 
modification thereto be agreed to by the Parties and approved 
by the Commission "with finalityu. (Stip. at§§ 16.1-16.3 and 
§ 3.1.) If the Agreement is not approved by the Commission in 
its entirety and the Parties cannot agree to a modification 
required by the Commission, the Agreement, by its terms, is 
void. (Stip. at § 16.3.) If at any time the Agreement is 
found to be voidable or unenforceable by any court or agency, 
any remaining terms of the Agreement are likewise void and 
unenforceable. (Agr. at§ VIII-2.) 
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The finality aspects of the Agreement were 
specifically addressed by the Parties during the course of the 
hearings. (Tr. at 1611.) Indeed the Commission revealed that 
if it were to approve the Agreement and at a later date 
reconsider it, the whole purpose of the Agreement would be 
defeated. (Tr. at 1611.) 
C. The Association Expressed its View to the 
Commission that the Agreement is Based on an Erroneous 
Interpretation of the Wexpro Decision Which is unfair 
to Shareholders, But Supported its Approval if the 
Commission would Render a Final and Res Judicata order. 
The Association presented to the Commission its view 
that the Agreement was entered into in large part on an 
erroneous interpretation of the wexpro Decision, i.e., the only 
issue before the supreme court was one of jurisdiction and many 
statements made by the Court were obiter dicta which this Court 
did not and would not consider binding. (Br. at 1-10; Tr. at 
1910-1917.) The Parties acknowledged specifically that the 
utility customers have a tenuous claim, if any at all, to the 2 
1/2% royalty on properties independently acquired by wexpro 
(nAfter Acquired Properties"), and that inclusion of such 
benefit in the Agreement constituted a substantial concession 
on the part of wexpro and MFS to settle the matter and resulted 
8 in a valuable benefit to customers. 
8 Herman G. Roseman testifying for the Division 
said with respect to a question concerning the fairness of 
royalty payments on the After Acquired Properties: •Those are 
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The Association adduced testimony that the Agreement 
does not constitute a fair distribution of assets from the 
shareholders' standpoint, but that the Agreement serves a 
beneficial purpose to the extent that it is final and 
b . d' 9 in ing. 
8 (Cont.) properties with respect of which it is my 
understanding of the facts that the ratepayers have never borne 
any of the costs or risks except possibly indirectly. That is, 
those properties were never in the 105 account, they never were 
a part of the capital account of the regulated company, the 
ratepayers never paid capital carrying charges, delay rentals, 
nor would they pay for the cost of the lease were it to be 
cancelled. • • • In the interest of getting some sort of a 
settlement that was a concession made by the company in an 
attempt which I regard as not insubstantial and this was very 
beneficial, or potentially beneficial to ratepayers.• 
(Emphasis added.) Tr. at 1028 and 1029. MFS's view of the 
customers' claim in the After Acquired Properties was stated by 
Edward Clyde as follows: "There's a category 6 that by no 
stretch of the imagination could the utility claim an interest 
in, but the properties that were in contention have all been 
put in and then decided [sic] under our formula.• (Emphasis 
added.) Tr. at 1932. 
9 John F. O'Leary testified for the Association 
with respect to his opinion concerning the Agreement. He was 
an extremely well-qualified witness as is evidenced by his 
employment background indicating he has held, among others, the 
following positions: Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior, Chief, Bureau of Natural Gas of the Federal Power 
Commission, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Director of 
Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Energy 
Resources Board of New Mexico, Administrator of the Federal 
Energy Administration, Deputy Secretary of U.S. Department of 
Energy. Additionally Mr. O'Leary has served as a private 
consultant and has appeared on numerous occasions as a witness 
before congressional committees and before the Public service 
Commissions of several states with respect to energy resource 
development. (Tr. at 1215-1217.) 
Mr. O'Leary's testimony with respect to the finality 
aspects of the Agreement was as follows: •r think from the 
standpoint of the stockholders, given the events of the past 
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The Association urged the Commission to adopt the 
Agreement with the important qualification that the commission 
enter an order that is binding and res judicata, i.e., the 
order be rendered in a fashion that it cannot be modified or 
repealed by the present Commission or future Commissions. (Tr. 
at 1611 and 1612; Br. at 13-20.) The Association specifically 
advised the Commission of those findings and conclusions that 
are necessary to the rendering of a res judicata order. (Tr. 
at 1973; Br. at 20-22.) 
D. The Commission's Order Contains Statements 
Creating Uncertainty as to its Intended Res 
Judicata Effect and Fails to Incorporate 
Essential Findings and Conclusions. 
In adopting the Agreement the Commission found as a 
conclusion of law, that the transfer of the certain properties 
and benefits to be received in return, are intended to be 
final. Paragraph 6 of the "Conclusions of Law" so provide: 
The Commission's findings and 
conclusions with regard to the transfer of 
properties and the allocation of benefits 
contemplated by the Settlement, including 
the findings and conclusions that the 
9 (Cont.) 2 1/2 years, there will be a tendency unless some 
device can be found to make this final and binding to continue 
to look over their shoulder. They found that they were 
operating on a premise that turned out to be error at the ~ime 
of the supreme court's decision. I think they would not like 
to find themselves four or five years from now in a situation 
where this agreement could be unravelled to their detriment." 
Tr. at 1226 and 1227. 
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transfer of properties and the allocation of 
benefits are reasonable and for market value 
and are in the public interest, are intended 
by the Commission to be final and not 
subject to future change (except through an 
appropriate and timely petition for 
rehearing or judicial review). The 
Commission so concludes because to ensure 
the proper development of said properties, 
the parties must be able to rely on the 
finality of the findings and conclusions in 
regard to the transfer of properties and 
apportionment of benefits. The Commission 
also is entitled to rely on the finality of 
its order. (Ord. at 21.) 
However, the Commission made this conclusion illusory 
by including other unnecessary and improper extraneous 
statements in the Order which create confusion and uncertainty 
as to the res judicata effect of the Order and by failing to 
include certain other findings and conclusions which are 
fundamental and essential to the entry of a final res judicata 
decision. 
The Commission included numerous statements of 
philosophy, findings of fact and conclusions of law which are 
inconsistent with res judicata principles (the •rnconsistent 
Provisions"). The following Inconsistent Provisions are found 
in the Commission's statements of philosophy (the Commission 
recognized that such statements are not findings of fact and 
conclusions of law): 
1. The Commission believes the utility business 
of MFS to be the cornerstone of its 
operations and that other activities must 
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enhance and not jeopardize that 
cornerstone. It is for these reasons that 
the Commission is vitally interested in 
company restructuring which is in effect 
diversification of functional separation 
and we believe Utah statutes authorize ' 
Commission review of such proposals, and the 
setting aside or modification of same if, 
after a hearing, the scheme itself, or its 
logical or intended consequences, are found 
to be detrimental to the utility cornerstone 
or injurious to the public interest. 
(Emphasis added. Ord. at 8.) 
2. Third, the Commission believes the 
no-profits-to~affiliates rule discussed in 
the Utah Supreme court's decision and the 
potential for conflict of interest or 
sweetheart relationship within the structure 
of MFS and its subsidiaries require 
continued and ongoing scrutiny by the 
Commission of MFS and all of its 
subsidiaries whether or not they are subject 
to a regulated rate of return. The 
commission further notes that the supreme 
court has appeared to elevate management 
responsibility to utility customers to a 
form of 'trust' relationship which also 
requires such ongoing scrutiny. (Emphasis 
added. Ord. at 8.) 
3. Fifth, the Commission believes that 
exploration for the development of energy 
resources are an appropriate activity for 
MFS, both as part of its regulated 
activities and those which are not subject 
to a regulated rate of return. The 
commission recognizes the past success of 
MFS' exploration and development program and 
believes that MFS should continue in the 
future such programs both for the benefit of 
its utility operations and those which are 
not subject to a regulated rate of return. 
The commission notes that while exploration 
and development of gas has historically been 
a utility activity conducted by MFS pursuant 
to commission orders as a joint regulated/ 
non-regulated venture, the decision by MFS 
to abandon exploration as a utility 
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undertaking has been implemented 
unilaterally without Commission sanction. 
The Commission at this time and for the 
purpose of this settlement finds it 
unnecessary to determine if MFS' utility 
activities, which are subject to a regulated 
rate of return, should include an 
exploration and development program. (Ord. 
at 9.) 
General provisions, creating unnecessary ambiguity, 
which may be claimed as inconsistent, are also found in the 
commission's statements outlining •evidence, testimony, 
statements and argument of counsel upon which the Findings, 
conclusions and Order are made •••• •,as follows: 
4. Notwithstanding any language which might be 
construed to the contrary in either the 
agreement or stipulation all parties have 
agreed on the record that the acceptance of 
the settlement by the Commission in no way 
limits or affects the Commission's 
jurisdiction or regulatory authority and 
further is not to be construed as limiting 
the Commission and its future regulation of 
MFS. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 11.) 
General provisions, creating unnecessary ambiguity, 
which may be claimed as inconsistent, found in the •Findings of 
Fact•, are as follows: 
5. As will be outlined in the following 
findings, the Commission accepts the 
Stipulation and Agreement as means of 
dealing with the 'Wexpro' case and related 
matters. The Commission does not and could 
not waive any of its jurisdiction or 
regulatory power and authority, in so 
accepting. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 18.) 
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6. As stated in finding (1) above, 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company is a regulated 
public utility and it cannot escape this by 
organizing itself into different corporate 
entities, parent and subsidiary in nature. 
By approving this Settlement and by past 
actions this Commission acknowledges and 
supports the proposition that MFS may have 
activities which are not limited to a 
'regulated' rate of return. we do not, 
however, give up our necessary access to 
information from the parent or its 
subsidiaries, or our lawful regulatory 
control over MFS or any of its parties in 
accepting this Settlement. (Emphasis 
added. Ord. at 18.) 
7. The Commission is not entirely 
persuaded that under attractive 
circumstances investors will not support a 
regulated exploration and development 
program, that such a program will cause 
problems with partners in the field or with 
the ability of MFS to keep employees. 
However, the Commission finds that it is 
unnecessary to make a final determination on 
this matter for the purpose of this 
proceeding. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 18.) 
Provisions creating unnecessary ambiguity which may be 
claimed as inconsistent found in the "Conclusions of Law", are 
as follows: 
8. The settlement is an agreement between 
the parties and approval thereof by the 
Commission does not modify or in any way 
limit the jurisdiction of the Commission to 
require information from the parties and to 
investigate transactions under the 
settlement in which the parties are 
involved. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 22.) 
9. By adopting and approving the 
Stipulation, the Commission does not 
relinquish or limit any jurisdiction or 
statutory authority it possesses. (Emphasis 
added. Ord. at 22.) 
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In addition to incorporating confusing Inconsistent 
Provisions in the Order, the Commission failed to include in 
the Order necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
examples of which are set forth in Plaintiffs' application for 
rehearing and the Association's brief, i.e., the Commission 
acts in its judicial capacity, policy considerations support 
res judicata finality, the Order shall not be open to 
collateral attack in subsequent proceedings, certain properties 
are transferred outside the Commission's regulatory authority 
and the Order shall be final and binding on all persons 
including this and future Commissions. (Appl. at 3 and 4; Br. 
at 20-22.} 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable 
Court set aside the order and remand the case to the Commission 
with directions that it enter a new order which comports with 
the purpose and intent of Parties that the Agreement be 
approved with res judicata finality. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Order is sufficiently explicit as to 
its intended finality and otherwise comports with res judicata 
principles. 
2. Whether the Commission erred in issuing an order 
which does not comport with res judicata principles where the 
paramount purpose of the Agreement is to obtain a final and 
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binding resolution of certain issues and where it is a 
condition to the vitality of the Agreement that the Commission 
approve it with finality. 
3. Where the Commission approves the transfer of 
assets to a non-utility subsidiary of the Company, does the 
Commission relinquish jurisdiction over the transferred assets? 
4. Whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously, thereby depriving Plaintiffs of property without 
due process, by entering an order which does not comport with 
principles of res judicata finality. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TO BE ACCORDED BINDING AND RES JUDICATA EFFECT, 
AN ORDER OF THE COMMISSION MUST BE CLEAR IN ITS 
INTENT AND INCORPORATE CERTAIN FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The doctrine of res judicata is a judicial principle 
which provides that a final judgment on the merits is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent suit between the same parties on 
the same cause of action. The doctrine binds parties and their 
privies both as to the issues actually litigated in the first 
suit and as to the issues which might have been raised and 
decided in that action. 5 Mezines, Administrative Law § 40.01 
(1981). It is a well accepted view that, under appropriate 
circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata applies to 
administrative agency decisions. 2 Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise§ 18.02 (1970 Supp.). 
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A. Res Judicata Principles are Properly Accorded to 
Administrative Decisions Made in a Judicial 
Capacity. 
That res judicata principles apply to administrative 
decisions was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
United states v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 
394, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966). In that case the Court 
acknowledged the hesitation of courts in some instances to 
apply res judicata principles to administrative agency 
decisions, but made it clear that when an agency acts in a 
judicial capacity, its decision should be accorded res judicata 
effect. The Court stated: 
Occasionally, courts have used language to 
the effect that res judicata principles do 
not apply to administrative proceedings, but 
such language is certainly too broad. When 
an administrative agency is acting in a 
judicial capacity and resolves disputed 
issues of fact properly before it which the 
parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
litigate, the courts have not hesitated to 
apply res judicata to enforce repose. 384 
U.S. at 421-422. 
The principles of administrative res judicata have 
been recognized by many jurisdictions. Matos v. secretary of 
Health Education and Welfare, 581 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1978); 
Cooper v. NTSB, 546 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1976); Hudson River 
Fishermen's Assoc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 498 F.2d 827 (2nd 
Cir. 1974); A. Duda & Sons Coop. Assoc. v. United States, 495 
F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd on rehearing, 504 F.2d 970 (5th 
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Cir. 1974); Old Dutch Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers and Dairy 
Employees Local Union No. 584, 281 F. Supp. 971 (E.D.N.Y. 
1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Borough of Lansdale, 424 A.2d 
514 (Pa. 1981); Campbell v. Superior Court in and for County of 
Maricopa, 18 Ariz. App. 287, 501 P.2d 463 (1972). 
Several years ago this Court acknowledged that when 
the Commission renders a decision in its judicial capacity, res 
judicata may properly apply. The Court in Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941) stated: 
'The rule which forbids the reopening of a 
matter once judicially determined by 
competent authority applies as well to the 
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, 
executive, or administrative officers and 
boards acting within their jurisdiction as 
to the judgments of courts having general 
judicial powers.' (Citations omitted.) 117 
P.2d at 302. 
The Utah Court attempted the difficult task of 
distinguishing the judicial functions of an administrative 
agency and in so doing stated: 
The judicial function is to define the legal 
rights and obligations conferred or imposed 
by law upon the community to the individual, 
the individual to the community, or one 
individual to another individual; and to 
apply the remedy and when one such party has 
infringed the right of, or failed in his or 
its obligation to the other. • • • The 
judicial function is not self-activating. 
It comes into operation only on request of 
the community or of an individual, when such 
party thinks another has interfered with his 
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rights, or failed in obligations to him. 
The judicial function only plays a role when 
there is an apparent controversy over the 
extent or infringement of legal rights, and 
appeal to the judiciary is made by one party 
to define and fix the legal rights of the 
parties with respect to the matter in 
controversy. (Emphasis added.) Id. 
The Order was unquesti~nably rendered within the 
"judicial" capacity of the Commission, if such a concept is 
deemed necessary to the finality of the Agreement. The Order 
defines the legal rights and obligations of MFS and its 
subsidiaries to the community with respect to certain 
properties. The controversy arose upon the appeal of the 
Division to the Utah supreme Court from an order of the 
Commission holding that it had no jurisdiction over the 
transfer of the long established non-utility oil properties 
from MFS and wexpro. The Commission, by adopting the 
Agreement, resolved controversies concerning legal rights and 
obligations with respect to properties and their exploration 
and development, and thereby acted in its judicial capacity. 
The premise that the Commission acted in its judicial 
capacity in entering an order adopting the Agreement is further 
supported by a decision of the United States supreme court 
wherein it expressed the view that it is an exercise of 
judicial power to render a judgment on consent. Pope v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 1, 89 L.Ed. 3 (1944}. The court stated: 
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,al 
:Ml 
It is a judicial function and an 
~xercise of the judicial power to render 
Judgment on consent. A judgment upon 
consent is 'a judicial act.' (Citations 
omitted.) It is likewise a judicial act to 
give judgment on a legal obligation which 
th7 court finds to be established by 
stipulated facts • • • . (Emphasis added. 
Citations omitted.) 323 u.s. at 12. 
Wh ·1 th Ut h 1 · 1 10 11 i e e a eg1s ature and this Court have 
recognized the judicial functions of the Commission, it has 
been acknowledged that it is a difficult task to delineate the 
judicial from the legislative functions of an administrative 
agency. In his concurring opinion in Mulcahy, supra, Justice 
Wolfe stated: 
He indeed is to be congratulated who can 
pick out the legislative, the executive and 
judicial ingredients of many completed 
administrative processes. 117 P.2d at 307. 
10 See Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1.3 (1953), which 
provides in part: "The public service commission shall 
exercise all quasi-judicial and rule-making powers in regard to 
public utilities as provided in Title 54. The execution of any 
rules, regulations or orders of the public service commission 
of Utah issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial or rule-making 
power shall be made effective and administered under the 
executive director of the department of business regulations." 
(Emphasis added.) 
11 This court expressly recognized the judicial or 
quasi-judicial nature of Commission functions in Wycoff Co. v. 
Public service Comm'n., 13 Utah 2d 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962), 
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 819, 9 L.Ed.2d 59 (1962); and Common 
Cause of Utah v. Public service Comm'n., 598 P.2d 1312 {Utah 
1979). 
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Plaintiffs submit that all terms of the Agreement 
dealing with the conveyance and exploration and development of 
the properties, as well as provisions concerning monetary 
expenditures must be adopted with finality. The Commission 
failed to make the essential finding that in approving these 
aspects of the Agreement it acted in its judicial capacity. 
Moreover, a finding that the Commission acted in its judicial 
capacity in rendering the Order is just one of several findings 
necessary to the rendering of a res judicata decision. 
B. Where Public Policy Considerations Support 
Repose, Res Judicata Attaches to an 
Administrative Decision. 
Commentators have criticized courts for expending 
their energies in attempting to classify or define various acts 
of administrative agencies for the purpose of determining the 
propriety of applying res judicata principles. Kenneth Culp 
Davis in his consummate treatise on administrative law states 
that the best approach to finding administrative res judicata 
is not to use labels, but rather inquire with respect to the 
underlying policy considerations which support finality. 
Professor Davis states: 
The best approach is to avoid the labels 
that have been attached to various functions 
for other purposes and to determine what is 
judicial or non-judicial for purposes of res 
judicata by emphasizing factors which relate 
to res judicata • • The question is not 
what is judicial in the abstract or for some 
other purpose. The question is whether 
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considerations relating to res judicata 
require that the particular action be 
regarded as judicial or non-judicial. 2 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.08 (1958). , 
Davis specifically criticizes the Mulcahy decision in 
attempting to determine whether or not res judicata should 
apply to a Commission order based upon an analysis of judicial 
versus non-judicial functions. Davis states: 
The deficiency in this type of analysis is 
that it reaches a conclusion as to what is 
res judicata without considering the reasons 
for permitting or preventing the 
relitigation of the same or similar issues. 
Whether the issue relates to 'privilege' or 
to 'legal right,' a second adjudication of 
static facts is undesirable in absence of 
some special reason for permitting it. The 
court's attention should be focused upon the 
reasons for and against a second 
adjudication of the same or similar issues, 
not upon a futile effort to tag functions as 
abstractly judicial or non-judicial. Id. 
That policy considerations support the entry of a res 
judicata order adopting the Agreement is self-evident. To 
enter a non-final order or an order open to modification is to 
destroy the "raison d'etre" of the Agreement. By its own 
terms, finality is a condition to the enforceability of the 
Agreement. The shareholders of MFS and Wexpro have a 
substantial investment at stake. MFS and Wexpro must have the 
continued confidence and support of shareholders to maintain 
economic viability. The Agreement must be adopted in a res 
judicata fashion so that the shareholders and investors can, at 
-33-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
last, stop •1ooking over their shoulders• and feel secure that 
the Agreement will not be unravelled to their detriment. 
Finality is particularly important to shareholders in view of 
the history of the Wexpro case where the Commission and 
shareholders thought Commission decisions regarding allocation 
of properties were final and operated for 40 years in reliance 
thereon only to have their investment and operating decisions 
overturned by the wexpro Decision. Shareholders must be secure 
that the Order at last achieves a final resolution, as is 
required in any adjudication and settlement of property rights 
and interests. 
The Commission was advised of the importance of 
including in its findings a statement that public policy 
considerations support res judicata finality of its order. 
(Br. at 22.) such a finding is particularly desirable for the 
purpose of avoiding a controversy that could arise in the 
future as to whether or not the Order is indeed entered into 
pursuant to the judicial function of the Commission, and is 
further necessitated because the Order is based on a 
stipulation. 
C. An Agency Decision Rendered Pursuant to a 
settlement Agreement Must be Clear as to its 
Intended Res Judicata Effect. 
While it is a well-accepted view that a judgment 
entered by consent of the parties may be res judicata to the 
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same extent as if entered after contest, the general rules of 
res judicata do not apply indiscriminately to such judgments. 
Annot., 345 U.S. 505, 97 L.Ed. 1188 (1953). Certain 
limitations to the general rules have been stated as follows: 
The extent to which a judgment or 
decree entered by consent is conclusive in a 
subsequent action should be governed by the 
intention of the parties, as expressed in 
the agreement which is the basis of the 
Judgment and gathered from all the 
circumstances, rather than by a mechanical 
application of the general rules governing 
the scope of estoppel by judgment. • . . In 
particular, it seems that, in the absence of 
an unambiguous agreement of the parties to 
the contrary, a judgment by consent does not 
operate as a collateral estoppel as to 
questions of fact or law involved in the 
litigation so as to preclude the parties 
from litigating the same questions in 
another action based upon a cause of action 
different from the one upon which the 
consent judgment was entered. 
* * * * 
From reading the cases on the subject 
under annotation it becomes manifest that, 
in consenting to a judgment or decree, 
ordinarily the parties and their counsel 
fail to give adequate attention to the 
question whether and to what extent the 
judgment is intended to be conclusive in a 
subsequent action on the same or another 
cause. It is advisable to incorporate in 
the JUdgment concise and clear stipulations 
on that question. Id. at 119. 345 us at 
506. (Emphasis added). 
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The difficulty courts have in according a consent 
decree the same conclusive effect as a contested decree seems 
to be that the consent judgment represents the agreement of the 
parties and not necessarily the independent examination of the 
subject matter by the tribunal. 
In the proceedings below, the Commission closely 
scrutinized the Agreement and conducted extensive hearings in 
an effort to be assured that the Agreement is lawful and in the 
public interest. The Association apprised the Commission that 
in light of the limited application of res judicata to agency 
decisions and particularly given the fact that the order 
rendered by the Commission would be pursuant to a consent or 
settlement, the order rendered must be unambiguous and contain 
certain findings and conclusions clarifying the Commission's 
intentions with regard to finality. (Br. at 20.) The 
Commission was urged to avoid the pitfalls inherent in a 
judgment based on stipulation by incorporating in its findings 
and conclusions statements that its order is final, binding and 
not subject to modification or repeal by this Commission or 
future Commissions; that the Order shall not be the subject of 
collateral attack in subsequent proceedings of any nature; that 
the Commission acts in its judicial capacity in rendering the 
Order; and that public policy considerations support repose. 
(Br. at 13-22.) The Commission unreasonably and improperly 
failed to incorporate such necessary findings and conclusions 
in the Order. 
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D. The Order Is Ambiguous as to Its Intended Res 
Judicata Effect. 
The extent to which a decision entered pursuant to 
stipulation is res judicata is governed by the express 
intentions of the parties. Annot., 345 u.s. 505, 97 L.Ed. 1188 
(1953). The Agreement is explicit with respect to its intended 
finality. However, the Order is replete with extraneous 
statements indicating that the Commission reserves continuing 
regulatory authority to review, modify or repeal the Agreement. 
Certain provisions contained in the Order reveal that 
the Commission reserves the right to review, set aside or 
modify the functional separation of MFS and its subsidiaries 
and maintain ongoing scrutiny of MFS and its subsidiaries. 
(Ord. at 8.) The Commission states that it does not forego any 
regulatory power or authority in adopting the Agreement, (Ord. 
at 11 and 18), and that it retains lawful regulatory control 
over MFS or any of the parties to the Agreement {Ord. at 18.) 
The Inconsistent Provisions indicating that the Commission 
retains continuing regulatory authority over the subject matter 
of the Agreement, create serious questions as to whether the 
Commission intends the Order to be final and binding upon this 
Commission and future Commissions and thereby preclude the 
application of res judicata. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Inconsistent 
Provisions of the Order do not preclude the application of res 
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judicata, the Order is ambiguous with respect to which terms of 
the Agreement are approved with res judicata finality. The 
Commission states in its Order that its findings "with regard 
to the transfer of properties and allocation of benefits. 
are intended to be final. The Commission leaves open the 
question of whether or not the terms of the Agreement providing 
for the exploration and development of the certain properties 
and monetary expenditures are also intended to be final. 
A public utility commission decision will be 
interpreted under the same rules by which other writings are 
construed. Creason v. American Bridge, 384 F.2d 475 (10th Cir. 
1967); Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Palm Springs Utility Co., Inc., 
24 Ariz. App. 124, 536 P.2d 245 (1975). Under the legal maxim, 
expressio unius exclusio alterius (mention of one thing in a 
writing implies the exclusion of another), the Order must be 
construed as not approving exploration and development and 
monetary expenditures provisions of the Agreement with finality 
inasmuch as such provisions were not referred to in the 
orders. Union Pac. R. co. v. Bean, 167 or. 535, 119 P.2d 575 
(1941); State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Dept. of Public 
Service, 1 Wash 2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939). It is essential 
that res judicata apply to such provisions so that MFS and its 
subsidiaries can proceed diligently in reliance thereon. 
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II. CERTAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE AND UNSUPPORTED IN LAW. 
Not only do the Inconsistent Provisions improperly 
create ambiguity concerning the intended finality of the Order, 
certain findings of fact and conclusions of law contained 
therein, are wholly contr~ry to the evidence and are 
unsupported in law. 
A. The Participants to the Proceedings did not Agree 
that the Acceptance of the settlement by the 
Commission Would not Limit or Affect the 
Commission's Jurisdiction or Regulatory Authority. 
The Commission states in Provision No. 4: 
Notwithstanding any language which might be 
construed to the contrary in either the 
agreement or stipulation all parties have 
agreed on the record that the acceptance of 
the settlement by the Commission in no way 
limits or affects the Commission's 
Jurisdiction or regulatory authority and 
further is not to be construed as limiting 
the Commission and its future regulation of 
MFS. (Emphasis added. Ord. at 11.) 
This statement is an overly broad conclusion upon 
which the Commission's findings are made, is not supported by 
the evidence and creates uncertainty as to the res judicata 
effect of the Order. The Agreement incorporates the intent of 
the Parties that it be final and not subject to modification or 
rescission and that if it is not approved with finality it 
shall be void. (Agr. at §§ VIII-2 and VIII-5; Stip. at SS 
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16.1-16.3, 3.1 and 8.2.) The finality aspects of the Agreement 
were specifically addressed during the course of the 
proceedings. (Tr. at 1611-1612 and 1973.) The Association 
briefed the Commission at length on the importance of rendering 
a res judicata decision. (Tr. at 1919-1921; Br. at 14-22.) In 
order to enter such a decision the Commission necessarily 
limits its authority to regulate by amending or repealing its 
decision. In fact, the Association specifically requested the 
Commission to incorporate a finding in the Order acknowledging 
that in adopting the Agreement the Commission necessarily 
transfers certain properties outside of the Commission's 
jurisdiction. (Br. at 21.) 
The participants to the proceedings assured the 
Commission that if in rendering its order it exceeded its 
statutory authority the order would be void. However, at no 
time did the participants agree that the Commission would not 
limit its jurisdiction or regulatory authority. To have done 
so would have been to take a position antithetical to the 
purpose and intent of the Agreement. 
B. The Commission Can Decide with Finality the 
Issues in the Case by Taking Jurisdiction and 
Exercising It, and Having Done so, in that sense, 
It Has Lost Jurisdiction Over the Property and 
Benefits and, in that Sense, It Must Relinquish 
its Regulatory Power, in Approving the Agreement. 
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The Order contains a finding contrary to the evidence 
in Inconsistent Provision No. 5, and an unsupported conclusion 
of law in Inconsistent Provision No. 9, which provide: 
5. As will be outlined in the 
following findings, the Commission accepts 
the Stipulation and Agreement as means of 
dealing with the 'Wexpro' case and related 
matters. The Commission does not and could 
waive any of its jurisdiction or regulatory 
power and authority in so accepting. 
(Emphasis added. Ord. at 18). 
9. By adopting and approving the 
Stipulation, the Commission does not limit 
or relinquish any jurisdiction or statutory 
authority it possesses. (Emphasis added. 
Ord. at 22.) 
Contrary the findings and conclusions set forth above, 
the Commission by entering a final order, at that point in 
time, of necessity must give up its regulatory power or 
authority to amend the Order. It is a condition to the 
vitality of the Agreement that its terms be final. Therefore, 
if the Commission does not forego its jurisdiction and 
regulatory power to amend the Order, it takes action in direct 
opposition to the purpose and intent of the Agreement. 
Furthermore, the Commission is able to relinquish its 
jurisdiction by rendering a res judicata decision. Where an 
administrative agency renders a decision in its judicial 
capacity or where policy considerations support finality, the 
decision is res judicata and is therefore binding and not 
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subject to modification, i.e., the Commission has no further 
regulatory power to modify the decision. United States v. Utah 
Construction Co., 384 U.S. 394, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966); Mulcahy 
v. Public Service Comm'n, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941); 2 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 1808 (1958). on the one 
hand, the Commission cannot waive jurisdiction it has to make a 
decision, but having exercised its jurisdiction it can and will 
in the process, relinquish further powers over the Agreement by 
approving it. 
The Commission's findings and conclusions set forth 
above may be based upon its confusion with the concept that 
where the Commission enters an order that incorporates an 
erroneous interpretation of law or where the Commission acts in 
excess of its authority, its order may be set aside as being 
beyond its jurisdiction. Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944). For example, the Commission 
cannot lawfully, under its statutory mandate, order that it no 
longer will regulate the operations of a public utility such as 
MFS. The concept is analogous to the legal principle that a 
decision of a court tribunal may be vacated for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Contrary to the findings and conclusions 
in the Order, the Commission can, and in effect does, limit its 
further regulatory power to amend or repeal the terms of the 
Agreement, if its Order meets the requirements of a res 
judicata decision. 
-42-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Commission's finding of fact contained in 
Inconsistent Provision No. 5 that it does not and cannot waive 
its regulatory power by adopting the Agreement is wholly 
unfounded and contrary to the evidence. Similarly, the 
Commission's conclusion of law found in Inconsistent Provision 
No. 9 is an inaccurate statement of law. 
This Court has held on numerous occasions that a 
decision of the Commission may be set aside where its findings 
are not supported by evidence or law. Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 {1942): 
Bamberger Electric R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Utah 
357, 204 P. 314 {1922). Plaintiffs submit that the findings 
and conclusions contained in the Order are not so supported and 
that the Order must be set aside. 
III. THE FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO ENTER A RES 
JUDICATA ORDER CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRARY ACTION 
AND AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING OF PROPERTY. 
The Association supported the Commission's adoption 
and approval of the Agreement based on its understanding that 
the Commission intended to enter an order that would be binding 
upon this Commission and all future Commissions and not be 
subject to collateral attack in subsequent proceedings, i.e., 
the Commission would make a clear and unambiguous Order 
containing findings and conclusions which are essential to a 
res judicata order. 
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The Association expressed its view throughout the 
proceedings that the Agreement is based on an unduly broad 
interpretation of the wexpro Decision and that provision for 
royalty payments on After Acquired Properties is particularly 
inappropriate inasmuch as the customers have no justifiable 
claim in such properties. Relying upon its understanding that 
the Commission would render a res judicata order, the 
Association gave up the opportunity to object to the terms of 
the Agreement and assert its views as to what it deemed to be a 
valid consideration to be received for the division and 
exploration and development of the properties. Without notice 
and contrary to the purpose of the Agreement and the view 
expressed by the Commission itself, the Commission entered an 
order which is not res judicata. 12 In so doing the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, thereby 
12 Commissioner Cameron stated in response to 
Edward Clyde's discussion of the finality aspects of the 
Agreement: "I don't believe in good faith I could agree to a 
stipulation and then a week and a half later notice up a 
hearing as to whether or not Celsius and Wexpro were, indeed, 
public utilities. It would seem to me we'd be defeating the 
entire purpose of the stipulation. Tr. at 1611. Commissioner 
Bernard recognized the unfairness resulting from future 
regulatory power: "Well, Mr. Holbrook, would part of that 
decision be arrived at because of the, call it the 
capriciousness or whatever you want to call it, of ordering the 
Company to explore for several years and then governmental 
agencies stepping in and saying don't do it anymore? It's the 
ebb and flow of the people in power of the regulatory process 
that causes doubt, isn't it, in the mind of the shareholder?" 
Tr. at 1919. 
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depriving Plaintiffs of property without due process of law in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States of America and Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In Washington ex rel. 
Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 56 L.Ed. 863 
(1912), the United States Supreme Court stated that a 
determination of due process is not based merely upon the fact 
that a party is given an opportunity to be heard, but that it 
extends to the nature of the order itself. Concerning the 
order at issue, the Court stated: 
Its validity could not be sustained merely 
because of the fact that the carrier had 
been given an opportunity to be heard, but 
was to be tested by considering whether, in 
view of all of the facts, the taking was 
arbitrary and unreasonable or was justified 
by the public necessities which the carrier 
could lawfully be compelled to meet. For 
the guaranty of the Constitution extenas-to 
the protection of fundamental rights,--to 
the substance of the order as well as to the 
notice and hearing which precede it. 'The 
mere form of the proceeding instituted 
against the owner, even if he be admitted to 
defend, cannot convert the process used into 
due process of law, if the necessary result 
be to deprive him of his property without 
compensation.' (Citations omitted.) so 
that where the taking is under an 
administrative regulation, the defendant 
must not be denied the right to show that as 
a matter of law the order was so arbitrary, 
unjust or unreasonable as to amount to a 
deprivation of property in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Citations omitted; 
Emphasis added.) 244 U.S. at 524. 
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In response to a defendant's assertion that a statute 
was unconstitutional because it prevented a court from 
receiving evidence proving defendant's point, the Supreme Court 
stated in Fairchild: 
This position would be true if the defendant 
had not been put on notice as to what order 
was asked for and then given ample 
opportunity to show that it would be unjust 
or unreasonable to grant it. In this case, 
and under the statute, it was given such 
notice. The complaint alleged that some of 
the towns were important shipping points and 
that at all of them there was a public 
necessity that the roads be connected. The 
defendant denied each of these alleg~tions. 
The hearing, both on the law and on the 
facts, was necessarily limited to that 
issue. There could have been no valid order 
which was broader than that claim. Id. at 
525-526. (Emphasis added.) 
By not being provided notice by the Commission that it 
did not intend to enter a res judicata decision and thereby 
giving up the right to litigate their view of the proper 
consideration to be received for the transfer, and exploration 
and development of the properties, particularly royalties on 
the After Acquired Properties in which customers have no 
justifiable claim, the Plaintiffs have been deprived of 
property without due process of law. 
Where an order of the Commission is arbitrary and 
capricious and invades a person's constitutional rights, this 
Court has consistently held that such order should properly be 
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set aside. Barton Truck Line, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 
29 Utah 2d 392, 510 P.2d 927 (1973); Salt Lake Transfer co. v. 
Public Service Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960); 
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 
339 P.2d 1011 (1959); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Public service 
Comm'n, 102 Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 (1942). Plaintiffs submit 
that the Order is the product of an arbitrary and capricious 
action on the part of the Commission resulting in deprivation 
of property without due process and that the Order should be 
set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The Parties entered into the Agreement to resolve 
those complex and divisive issues emanating from the Wexpro 
Decision rendered over three years ago. The Agreement is the 
product of difficult arm's length negotiations wherein the 
Parties agree that MFS and wexpro made substantial concessions 
in their views of what would be required had the Wexpro 
Decision been fully litigated. The inclusion in the Agreement 
of royalty payments to the utility on After Acquired Properties 
was a particularly generous concession on the part of wexpro 
inasmuch as the utility has only an extremely questionable 
claim, if any, in such properties. The sole motivation for 
entering the difficult and seemingly impossible negotiations 
-47-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for a settlement of the issues raised by the Wexpro Decision is 
to at last achieve a final disposition of the matter. A final 
and res judicata decision is essential so that the Company will 
have the continued support of its shareholders and investors 
and so that management may act in reliance thereon. The 
Company and Wexpro may lose substantial property interests and 
valued employees if the matter is not finally resolved. In 
such event all parties concerned, including customers, lose 
valuable interests. 
During the course of the proceedings the Association 
voiced its serious reservations concerning the fairness of the 
Agreement to shareholders on the basis that the Agreement was 
entered into upon an overly broad interpretation of the wexpro 
Decision. However, the Association supported the Commission's 
adoption of the Agreement with the important condition that the 
Commission order adopting the Agreement be rendered in a form 
susceptible to the application of res judicata, i.e., the order 
be clear and unambiguous as to its intended finality and 
incorporate findings and conclusions which are essential to a 
decision entered on the basis of consent. The Association 
briefed the Commission on the requirements of an order based 
upon consent and specifically advised the Commission with 
respect to those findings and conclusions which are essential 
to a res judicata order. 
In contravention of the purpose of the Agreement, the 
Commission included in the Order extraneous, unnecessary and 
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improper statements creating ambiguity as to its res judicata 
effect. In addition to creating ambiguity, certain findings 
and conclusions are wholly unsupported by fact or law. 
Furthermore, the Commission refused to incorporate in the Order 
those findings and conclusions which are essential to a final 
and conclusive decision based upon stipulation. 
By entering an order which is not res judicata, the 
Commission has left the door ajar for adversaries of MFS or its 
subsidiaries to attack the Order or petition in the future for 
its amendment or repeal on the basis that the Commission 
retains continuing jurisdiction to change the provisions of the 
Agreement. By leaving the door ajar, the Commission undermines 
the paramount purpose of the Agreement that it be absolutely 
final so that MFS and its subsidiaries may proceed with 
business in reliance thereon. If the order can be modified or 
repealed in the future, MFS, its subsidiaries and shareholders 
lose a substantial benefit of the bargain represented by the 
Agreement and the Plaintiffs assume an unfair and unreasonable 
risk. 
The Order represents an arbitrary and capricious 
action and an unconstitutional taking of property without due 
process of law. Because of its understanding that the 
Commission intended to enter an order which would be res 
judicata, the Association gave up its right to litigate its 
view of a proper distribution of the properties pursuant to the 
Wexpro Decision. 
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This Court has recognized that its duties in reviewing 
a decision of the Commission are not merely perfunctory, but 
that it should provide substantial and meaningful review for 
the purpose of giving correction and guidance when the actions 
of the Commission are clearly inconsistent with its purpose. 
Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 30 Utah 
2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 {1973). For the reasons stated herein, 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to set aside the 
Order with instructions that the Commission render a new order 
consistent with the intent of the Agreement and in a form that 
can properly be accorded res judicata finality. such order 
should be particularly explicit with respect to the res 
judicata finality of those provisions of the Agreement dealing 
with the conveyance and exploration and development of the 
properties as well as provisions for monetary expenditures. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17 
1982. 
, 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
~~~~~ 
E~l~ 
Attorneys for 
Utility Shareholder 
Association of Utah, 
Alex Oblad and Harold Burton 
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